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UThe Draft U.K./U.S. Judgments
Convention: A British Viewpoint
P.M. North*
The United States and the United Kingdom are presently completing
negotiations on an accord that wllprovidefor the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of civil judgments. The negotiations have been the subject of
considerable debate, the sharpest criticism being expressed by British ex-
porters who fear that recognition of United States judgments in the United
Kingdom will subject them to increased antitrust and products liability
claims. Through an analysis of theproposed agreement against the existing
statutory and common law rules, Commissioner North addresses these criti-
cisms. He concludes that the additional burden of American judgments on
English defendants created by the agreement does not justify the present de-
gree of opposition to it.
On January 22, 1972, the Treaty of Accession to the European
Economic Community' was signed in Brussels on behalf of the six
original Member States2 and of the three new Member States.3 Un-
doubtedly that was a momentous occasion for the nine States involved,
especially for the three new members of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC). Certainly, it was to have profound political, economic,
and legal effects within the United Kingdom. For example, lawyers
and legislators in the United Kingdom have had to come to terms with
major inroads into the sovereignty of Parliament resulting from the
treaty obligations requiring the U.K. to give effect to EEC legislation.
Judges are faced with the problems of applying, and interpreting, an
increasing amount of so-called English law of foreign origin.4 This not
only involves legislation in the form of directives, regulations, and con-
* Law Commissioner for England and Wales; B.A., B.C.L., M.A., D.C.L., Oxford, Fellow of
Keble College, Oxford.
1 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 73) (1972).
2 The original member states are Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands.
3 The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland.
4 Dagtoglou, The English Judges and European Community Laws, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 76
(1978).
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ventions, but also binding decisions of the European Court of Justice in
Luxembourg. 5 This process has been described by Lord Denning M.R.
in a characteristically memorable way:
The first and fundamental point is that the Treaty concerns only those
matters which have a European element, that is to say, matters which
affect people or property in the nine countries of the common market
besides ourselves. The Treaty does not touch any of the matters which
concern solely England and the people in it. These are still governed by
English law. They are not affected by the Treaty. But when we come to
matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It
flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back, [sic]
Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is henceforward to be part of our
law. It is equal in force to any statute.6
The American reader may wonder at the significance to him of the
tide of EEC law flowing up the Thames.7 Nevertheless, part of the
flotsam to be found floating on this tide is the draft U.K./U.S. Conven-
tion for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in
Civil and Commercial Matters.8 This flotsam is certain to flow across
the Atlantic and then up the Mississippi, or up the St. Lawrence seaway
to the Great Lakes. The genesis of this draft Convention is to be found,
as implied above, in the Act of Accession by the new Member States to
the original EEC Treaties which was annexed to the 1972 Treaty of
Accession. 9 Under article 3(2) of the Act of Accession, the new Mem-
ber States undertook to accede to the convention provided for in article
220 of the EEC Treaty, i e., the Treaty of Rome.' 0 One of these is the
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters." This Convention came into force among
the six original Member States of the EEC in 1973. However, the new
Member States were given until October 1978 to finalize their accession
to it.t2 In order to better understand how this accord on jurisdiction
5 See Dagtoglou, supra note 4.
6 Bulmer Ltd. v. Bollinger, S.A., [1974] A.C. 401, 418.
7 See Nadelmann, Clouds over International Efforts to Unfy Rules of Conflict of Laws, 41
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 54, 58-62 (1977).
8 DRAFT CONVENTION PROVIDING FOR THE RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF JUDGEMENTS IN CIVIL MATTERS, CMND. No. 6771 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.K./U.S.
DRAFT CONVENTION].
9 Note I supra.
10 Treaty Instituting the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.
II The Convention on the Jurisdiction of Courts and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done September 27, 1968, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No.
L 299) (1972) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts].
12 The Convention on the Accession of the new Member States to the 1968 Convention was
signed in Luxembourg in October, 1978, 21 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 304) (1978).
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and recognition of foreign judgments affects the United States and led
to the draft U.K./U.S. Convention, t3 a brief account of it is necessary.
The 1968 Convention provides rules as to jurisdiction in civil and
commercial matters and the basic rule' 4 is that a person domiciled in
an EEC State' s shall be sued in the courts of that State. To that basic
rule there are a considerable number of exceptions, such as a provi-
sion' 6 that a person domiciled in an EEC State may also be sued in
another Member State in a tort action if that is the place of the harm.
There are also additional grounds of jurisdiction in insurance mat-
ters,' 7 consumer contract claims, 18 and in certain cases a choice of fo-
rum is permitted.' 9 Exceptionally exclusive grounds of jurisdiction are
laid down irrespective of domicile in such matters as claims concerning
rights in rem in immovable property or the validity of patents, trade-
marks and the like.20 The essential pattern, however, of the jurisdic-
tional rules of the Convention is that they apply only to defendants
domiciled in an EEC State. The corollary of this is that the Member
States are free to provide whatever differing jurisdictional rules they
like in cases falling outside the provisions of the Convention. So, for
example, French courts may continue to assume jurisdiction on the ba-
sis that the plaintiff is a French national2' provided the defendant is not
domiciled elsewhere in the EEC.
When one turns to the recognition provisions of the Convention,22
the general scheme is that all judgments of a Member State shall be
recognized elsewhere in the EEC, whether or not judgment in the origi-
nal State was assumed on the basis of the jurisdictional provisions of
the Convention. Thus, a judgment in a Member State against a person
domiciled in a country outside the EEC must, in principle, be recog-
nized elsewhere in the EEC no matter how exhorbitant the original
grounds of jurisdiction. Let us return to, and develop, the French ex-
ample just given.
An action is brought in France by a French national against a
13 For a detailed analysis of the Convention, see G. DROZ, COMPETENCE JUDICIARE ET EF-
FETS DES JUDGEMENTS DANS LE MARCHi COMMUN (Etude de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27
Septembre 1968) (1972).
14 Conventionon Jurisdiction of Courts, supra note 11, art. 2.
15 It is generally for each Member State to define domicile for itself. Id. arts. 52-53.
16 Id art. 5(3).
17 Id arts. 7-12A.
18 Id arts. 13-15.
19 Id art. 17.
20 id art. 16.
21 C. civ. arts. 14-15.
22 Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts, supra note 11, arts. 26, 30.
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United States company with assets in the U.S. and the U.K. The com-
pany has no connection with France or assets there, and the action is
based on a breach of contract elsewhere. Judgment in that action
would not be recognized at common law in England because the
French court would not be regarded as having an internationally valid
basis of jurisdiction over the defendant. 23 Nor would the judgment be
recognized in England under a bilateral recognition convention con-
cluded between the United Kingdom and France24 within the terms of
the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933.25 It
would also seem to be unlikely that such a judgment would be recog-
nized in the U.S. 26 Furthermore, the English courts would not have
taken jurisdiction over a claim by the French plaintiff against the
American corporate defendant if the defendant was not doing business
in the United Kingdom and there was no English connection other
than having assets there. However, once the EEC Convention comes
into force in the United Kingdom, all will be changed. Although the
English courts will continue to have no jurisdiction over such a case,
they will be required to recognize and enforce the French judgment in
England notwithstanding its internationally exhorbitant nature. In that
way, the English assets of the defendant company become available to
the French plaintiff, and the tide of EEC law can be seen to have
crossed the Atlantic.
The international repercussions of the EEC Convention have
caused concern in, for example, the United States2 7 and Australia,28 but
they were not unforeseen by the drafters of the EEC Convention. The
difficulty is intended to be met by article 59:29
This Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from assuming, in
a convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgements, an obli-
gation towards a third State not to recognise judgements given in other
Contracting States against defendants domiciled or habitually resident in
the third State where, in cases provided for in Article 4, the judgement
could only be founded on a ground of jurisdiction specified in the second
paragraph of Article 3.30
23 P.M. NORTH, CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 632-47 (9th ed. 1974).
24 Id at 667-72.
25 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13 (1933).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92, Comment e (1971).
27 See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 7, at 58-62.
28 Pryles and Trindade, The Common Market (EEC.) Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters-Possible Impact upon Australian Citizens, 48
Aus. L.J. 185, 192-95 (1974).
29 U.S./U.K. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8.
30 Id. The cases provided for in article 4 are those in which the defendant is domiciled outside
a Member State. The grounds of jurisdiction listed in article 3 are the main "exhorbitant"
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What this means in practice is that, if the United States and the United
Kingdom conclude a bilateral convention within the terms of article 59,
the United Kingdom would deny recognition to the French judgment
in the earlier example. Here, therefore, are the origins of the draft
U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention with which this article is primarily
concerned. 31 It is undoubtedly true that a bilateral convention on rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments such as one following the pat-
tern of the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of
1933,32 has much, from a United Kingdom standpoint, to commend it
in its own right. Indeed, there has been recent English judicial encour-
agement for some form of bilateral convention. 33 Nevertheless the ma-
jor impetus for the present negotiations between the United States and
the United Kingdom is the need for such a convention in order to shel-
ter American defendants behind the protection afforded by article 59 of
the EEC Convention.
Negotiations on the U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention were car-
ried on simultaneously with the United Kingdom's negotiations on ac-
cession to the EEC Convention. The bilateral negotiations resulted in a
draft Convention being initialled by officials from the United Kingdom
and the United States in October 1976.34 This draft did not bind the
two States, and it was published in the United Kingdom in April 197735
to enable consideration to be given to it by all interested parties. Very
considerable interest, and at times anxiety, has been shown in the draft
Convention on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, the opposition in the
United Kingdom to the draft Convention from various interested
groups, especially the insurance industry, led to the announcement by
the Attorney General in Parliament in June 1978 that "further negotia-
tions on it are probable." 36 Probability became reality in September
1978 when further negotiations took place.
It is not intended here to provide a detailed analysis of the provi-
sions of the draft Convention in its present published form. That has
been done already by commentators in both the United States37 and
grounds of jurisdiction in the Member States, including articles 14 and 15 of the French Code
Civil used in the earlier example.
31 See Bus. WEEK, Feb. 21, 1977, at 50.
32 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13 (1933).
33 Perry v. Zissis, [1977] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 607, 614, 617.
34 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8.
35 Id.
36 952 PARL. DEB. H.C. 321 (1978).
37 Hay and Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgements Convention between the United
States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 421 (1976) (commenting on an earlier draft);
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the United Kingdom.38 My purpose is to examine some of the
problems that the Convention has been thought to pose when viewed
through British eyes; but, to that end, it is necessary to describe in out-
line at least the salient features of the Convention.
The Convention does not affect the grounds on which courts in the
two countries may take jurisdiction. Its purpose is to lay down the cir-
cumstances in which the courts in one country will recognize and en-
force judgments given in the other. The Convention applies to all
judgments given in civil and commercial matters but there are two sets
of exclusions. The first gives an indication of that which falls outside
"civil and commercial matters, ' 39 so that matters of family law,40 status
and capacity,41 maintenance claims 42 and matters of succession 43 are
excluded, as are bankruptcy and winding-up matters,44 questions of so-
cial security,45 and the judicial administration of estates. 46 The secon-
dary category47 of exclusions relates to particular categories or aspects
of judgments in civil and commercial matters which are not to be en-
forceable. These include not only interlocutory matters48 and judg-
ments for the disclosure of evidence,49 but also judgments "to the
extent that they are for punitive or multiple damages" 50 and claims for
taxes, customs duties, and the like.51
Even if a judgment falls within the Convention, it may be denied
recognition on a number of grounds,52 some well-known at common
law, such as the judgment being contrary to public policy 53 or having
been obtained by fraud or without due notice having been given to the
Smit, The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgements.- A Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977).
38 Mathers, The UK/US Civil Judgements Convention-I, 127 NEw L.J. 777, 819 (1977); North,
Insurance and Foreign Judgements, 128 NEw L.J. 315 (1978).
39 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 2(3).
40 Id art. 2(3)(b).
41 Id art. 2(3)(a).
42 Id art. 2(3)(c).
43 Id art. 2(3)(d).
44 Id art. 2(3)(e).
45 Id art. 2(3)(f.
46 Id art. 2(3)(g).
47 Id art. 2(2). This category ofjudgments is excluded except for purposes of article 18, dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying note 83.
48 Id art. 2(2)(c).
49 Id art. 2(2)(d).
50 Id art. 2(2)(b).
51 Id art. 2(2)(a).
52 Id arts. 7-8.
53 Id art. 7(a).
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defendant.54 There are a number of other grounds of non-recognition
such as where the judgment is inconsistent with one in, or required to
be recognized in, "the court addressed"55 (the court where recognition
is sought), where the respondent enjoys immunity in the court ad-
dressed,5 6 where the judgment to be enforced is for a sum of money
which exceeds a statutory limit under the law of the court addressed
which applies under that court's rules of private international law,5 7 or
where the court addressed would have applied its own law to the case
and the judgment would disregard mandatory provisions of that law.5 8
Some further limitations on recognition may be seen in that a judgment
will be denied recognition unless it has "binding effect" in the "terri-
tory of origin,"5' 9 i e., in the law district where originally granted. Fur-
ther, recognition may be deferred if the judgment is subject to review in
the court of origin and if the court addressed is satisfied that review has
been or will be sought.60 Nor is recognition required if, by reason of
the subject matter or by the terms of a trust instrument, exclusive juris-
diction lies, under the law of the court addressed, in a court other than
that of the territory of origin,6' or if the original proceedings were
brought in violation of an agreement by the parties to submit to an-
other court.62
Once these hurdles are surmounted, the foreign judgment will be
recognized if it satisfies one of a number of varied jurisdictional crite-
ria.63 In many ways these are the heart of the Convention. Some of the
grounds are similar to those which, in the United Kingdom at least,
exist under the common law rules on recognition of foreign judgments
while others are more novel. Some of the grounds are general; others
relate to particular types of claims.
The general grounds are as follows: where the person against
whom the judgment is sought to be enforced was the plaintiff in the
foreign proceedings; 64 where the habitual residence or principal place
of business or place of incorporation of the defendant is within the ju-
54 Id art. 7(b).
55 Id art. 7(c)(i).
56 Id art. 7(d).
57 Id art. 8(c).
58 Id art. 8(d).
59 Id art. 4(1)(b).
60 Id art. 5(1).
61 Id. art. 6(a), (c).
62 Id art. 6(b).
63 Id. arts. 10-11.
64 Id art. 10(a).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:219(1979)
risdiction of the foreign court; 65 where the defendant had a branch
within the jurisdiction and the proceedings relate to business done
through that branch;66 where there exists an agreement in writing to
submit to the jurisdiction;67 and where an agent has been appointed to
receive service within the jurisdiction in relation to proceedings con-
cerning business conducted within the jurisdiction.68
So far as the special grounds of jurisdiction are concerned, they
may be summarized as follows: where the action is to determine rights
of ownership or possession over movable or immovable property, the
fact that the property was situated in the jurisdiction;69 where the ac-
tion concerns a trust, the fact that the trust's principal place of adminis-
tration was within that territory or that the trust instrument provided
that the court should have jurisdiction;70 where, in a contractual claim,
the parties reside or have their place of business within the jurisdiction
and the contractual obligation was to be performed there;71 where, in
the case of a contract to supply goods or services, the contract was pre-
ceded by advertising in, or directed to, the territory of origin and the
parties contemplated that the goods were to be used or the services per-
formed in that jurisdiction;72 where, in an action for damages for per-
sonal injury or damage to property, the acts occasioning the injury
substantially occurred and the damage was suffered in the Contracting
State (the United States or the United Kingdom) and either the injury
or the damage occurred in the territory of origin (the individual Ameri-
can State or part of the United Kingdom whose judgment is in issue).73
So far as all these grounds of jurisdiction are concerned, the court
addressed shall not be bound by any conclusions reached by the court
of origin,74 ie., conclusions of law reached from findings of fact, such
as where the defendant was habitually resident. However, the court
addressed shall be bound by findings of fact made in the court of origin
unless the respondent establishes they were incorrect, and if the defend-
ant appeared in the court of origin and failed to challenge the jurisdic-
tion, he cannot contest such findings in the court addressed.75
65 Id art. 10(b).
66 Id art. 10(c).
67 Id art. 10(d).
68 Id art. 10(e).
69 Id art. 10(h).
70 Id art. 10(i).
71 Id art. 10(g).
72 Id art. 10(f).
73 Id art. 10().
74 Id art. 12.
75 Id
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The provisions of the Convention do not prevent the recognition
of a judgment under the general law of the state addressed.76 For in-
stance, a court in the United Kingdom could recognize a United States
judgment given in jurisdictional circumstances falling outside the Con-
vention if that was permitted at common law, e.g., submission to the
jurisdiction. But, of course, such grounds of recognition could be abol-
ished either at the time of implementation of the Convention or at any
time thereafter.
If a judgment satisfies all of the jurisdictional and other criteria for
recognition, the procedures for recognition and enforcement are as laid
down in articles 14-16 of the Convention. Simply put, the Convention
requires the production of a copy of the foreign judgment,77 documen-
tary evidence as to the notice given to the defendant 78 and the grounds
on which jurisdiction was assumed,79 and a statement of the grounds
relied upon to establish jurisdiction under the Convention.80 No spe-
cial procedure is required for recognition. For enforcement the follow-
ing procedures are to be followed. An American judgment will be
registered in the United Kingdom by application to a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction,8' te., in the appropriate part of the United Kingdom.
Enforcement in the United States of a judgment from a United King-
dom court will involve application being made to the appropriate court
exercising judgment in the territory where enforcement is sought, and
enforcement is to be by the simplest and most rapid method provided
in that jurisdiction for the enforcement of non-local judgments.8 2
The final provision of the draft Convention to which reference
ought to be made in this brief survey of its contents is article 18 under
the head of "recognition and enforcement of third State judgments."
This relates to one of the justifications, from the U.S. point of view, for
having such a Convention. Subject to other treaty obligations, a judg-
ment of a third state given against a national, domiciliary, or resident
of one Contracting State, te., the U.S. or the U.K., shall be denied
recognition and enforcement by the other Contracting State if it would
not have been recognized or enforced had it been given against a per-
son similarly connected with the state addressed.8 3 It is this provision
76 Id art. 3, discussed further infra at text accompanying notes 143-44.
77 Id art. 15(2)(a).
78 Id art. 15(2)(b).
79 Id art. 2(c).
80 Id art. 15(2)(c).
81 Id art. 16(2).
82 id art. 16(1).
83 id art. 18(l)(a).
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which ties in with article 59 of the EEC Convention 84 so that, in the
earlier example, 85 a judgment by a French court, assuming jurisdiction
on the basis of the plaintiffs French nationality, against a company
domiciled in some part of the United States will be denied recognition
in England under article 18 of the draft Convention because such judg-
ment would be denied recognition had the defendant company been
domiciled in some part of the United Kingdom.
What sort of reception has this draft Convention received? The
fact that there is a need for it at all, in terms of the EEC Convention,
has been the subject of sharp criticism in the United States. The EEC
Convention has been castigated as discriminating against the United
States with the corollary that "this discrimination is indefensible on
any ground."86 Indeed, it has been said of the effect of the original
EEC Convention that:
The Six of the Common Market-or persons for them-found it proper to
challenge the rest of the world. No legal issue exists; the complaint is
considered justified by commentators. The challenge should be taken up.
The Six could be invited to agree on submission of the matter to the Inter-
national Court of Justice. The test would be 'due process of law', a con-
cept which has general standing.87
On the other hand, the draft U.K./U.S. Convention has been wel-
comed in the United States on the wider ground that it will "assure
much needed uniformity in the recognition and enforcement of English
judgments in the United States."' 88 But even this welcome for the
draft Convention has not been wholly uncritical. A general criticism is
that the Convention is too detailed and that it would have been better
to have had a less specific Convention--one that did not provide de-
tailed solutions to problems which have not yet arisen, with general
principles which would leave room for future development. 89 Ameri-
can commentators have also made detailed criticisms of the provisions
of the draft Convention, such as whether the exclusion of various types
of judgment from the Convention can be justified.90
While some commentators in the United Kingdom have guardedly
welcomed the draft Convention,9' the general reaction has been hostile.
84 Discussed supra at text accompanying notes 27-33.
85 Supra at text accompanying notes 21-26.
86 Smit, supra note 37, at 468.
87 Nadelmann, supra note 7, at 61.
88 Hay and Walker, supra note 37, at 449.
89 Smit, supra note 37, at 445-46, 468.
90 Id. at 448-53. See also Hay and Walker, supra note 37, at 425-26.
91 E.g., North, supra note 38; Clark, THE POST MAGAZINE & INS. MONITOR, May 25, 1978, at
1364-65.
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Indeed, it has been described as "an act of sheer folly."' 92 The hostility
has come both from lawyers93 and from commercial men.94 Their criti-
cisms have been both general and particular but have been made from
a standpoint very different from that of the American criticism. The
main attack has been on the ground that the Convention is one which
the United States is anxious to conclude because of the impact of the
EEC Convention but that it is one which has few, if any, advantages
for the United Kingdom and, indeed, contains major trading disadvan-
tages. Hence come such comments as:
The commercial and economic effects on those manufacturers who export
to the United States cannot be over-estimated and it seems likely that this
could lead to many manufacturers withdrawing altogether from the
American market. Thus the effect of this Convention will be very advan-
tageous indeed to the U.S.A. and one cannot see anything but a great
disadvantage for this country and its overseas trade. One has only to look
at the comparative size of the population and the vast difference in the
respective legal systems to wonder why it is necessary to put this legisla-
tion into effect. In most relevant cases this will result in what amounts to
an abrogation of our legal system in favour of one containing so many
features that are totally abhorrent to us.
95
Similar strongly worded opposition to the draft Convention has come
from lawyers:
We know of no-one who has been able to identify any substantial advan-
tage that will accrue to the U.K. from the proposed Convention. It is a
Treaty which confers benefits of a major nature on the U.S. without any
corresponding benefit to the U.K ..... .If there is to be a Treaty. . .it
is imperative first that it eliminates certain important difficulties with
which U.K. manufacturers and suppliers are at present faced and second
that any extension of common law procedures should only be considered
where no disadvantages to the U.K. will flow from it.96
Furthermore, the criticisms of the draft Convention have not been lim-
ited to those which have appeared in the general press and in legal and
other professional journals. It is clear that representations have been
made to the United Kingdom government by a wide range of firms and
trade associations, and there have been discussions between the United
Kingdom government and representatives of the insurance industry
92 Payne, J. CHARTERED INS. INST., April 1978 at 57, 59.
93 E.g., Memorandum submitted by a Joint Working Party of the Senate of the Inns of Court
and the Bar and The Law Society to the Lord Chancellor's Office (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Joint Working Party Memorandum]; 25 GUARDIAN GAZETTE 202 (1978).
94 Payne, POLICY, July 1977 at 566, 576; Robertson, POL'Y HOLDER INS. J., May 26, 1978 at
972.
95 Payne, supra note 94, at 566, 572.
96 Joint Working Party Memorandum, supra note 93.
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and others.97
All of this constitutes a picture of great anxiety and concern over
the draft Convention in the United Kingdom. Indeed, there is power-
ful opposition to the implementation of the draft Convention in its
published form, hence the further negotiations last autumn. Some of
the criticism is over-stated and fails to set the draft Convention against
the background of the present law, while other criticisms point to real
difficulties that the Convention might pose for British exporters in the
field of products liability.
One thing that has to be made clear from the outset, and which is
forgotten at times in the United Kingdom criticism, is that judgments
from courts in the U.S.A. are recognized in the United Kingdom under
the common law rules for the recognition of foreign judgments. 98 The
impact of the draft Convention has to be assessed on the basis of how
many more United States judgments will be recognized in the United
Kingdom. Here there are factors to be weighed on both sides of the
scales.
Judgments are recognized in the United Kingdom already, but
only if separate proceedings are taken on the judgment against the
judgment debtor in the courts in the United Kingdom.99 Under the
Convention, recognition and enforcement will be by the apparently
easier process of registration. What is questionable is whether the fact
that an action at common law has to be taken on the judgment is a
serious deterrent in cases where large sums of money are in issue, espe-
cially when the judgment creditor may apply for summary judgment' 0
on the ground that the debtor has no defense.101 Nevertheless, enforce-
ment may in theory be easier under the draft Convention, and the very
existence of such a Convention could encourage enforcement.
Various types of judgments in civil and commercial matters are
excluded from the draft Convention. 102 Several of these merely mirror
exceptions which are generally accepted at common law, such as judg-
ments for taxes. One important exception in the Convention concerns
the exclusion of judgments "to the extent that they are for punitive or
multiple damages."'10 3 In the United Kingdom, foreign judgments
97 952 PARL. DEB. H.C. 321 (1978).
98 P.M. NORTH, supra note 23, at 629-78.
99 Id at 632.
100 SuP. CT. PRAC. ORD. 14.
101 Grant v. Easton, 13 Q.B.D. 302 (1883). See also DICEY AND MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS
988-89 (9th ed. 1973).
102 Supra at text accompanying notes 39-51.
103 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 2(2)(b).
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which are of a penal nature are not enforced,1 04 but it has been sug-
gested very recently that this nonenforceability does not apply to for-
eign judgments for exemplary damages which may well be recognized
in the United Kingdom. 05 That suggests that the draft Convention
provides an exception to recognition not found at common law and one
which is of major significance given the anxieties expressed in the
United Kingdom over recognition of U.S. products liability judgments
which often contain a high degree of exemplary damages. 0 6 The ex-
clusion of judgments for multiple damages is most obviously aimed at
treble damage awards in the United States in antitrust cases. 10 7 While
this is welcomed in the United Kingdom, there is a wider concern over
judgments in antitrust cases. The English courts have recently had to
consider, at the highest level, the implications in England of American
antitrust proceedings against United Kingdom multinational compa-
nies, I0 8 and the prospect of antitrust actions in the United States
against British companies has led to the criticism that the exception for
multiple damages is too narrow. It has been argued, therefore, that all
judgments in antitrust matters should be excluded from the Conven-
tion-an argument which is not unaffected by the passing by Congress
of the Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976.109
While detailed criticism has been made of a number of the provi-
sions of the draft Convention, 10 the other major areas of difficulty are
the questions of the survival of common law rules of recognition' I I and
the Convention's own jurisdictional rules. 2 Article 3 states that the
Convention shall not prevent the recognition in the court addressed of
a judgment of a court of the territory of origin if that judgment would
104 Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150. See also Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 1.
1o5 S.A. Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 279, 299-300.
106 Cf. Smit, supra note 37, at 499, who opposes the inclusion of this exception in the draft
convention.
107 See also Desforge v. West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N.W.2d 633 (1950) (trespass to land).
108 Re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547. It should be pointed out that judg-
ments for disclosure of evidence are not enforceable under the draft Convention, art. 2(2)(d).
109 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976).
110 See, e.g., Joint Working Party Memorandum, supra note 93, where it is suggested that
further consideration be given to such matters as the definition of interlocutory judgments in arti-
cle 2(2)(c), the drafting of article 5(2), and whether provision should be made in article 7 for effect
to be given to a set-off or counterclaim, and that the Convention should not be applied to non-
money judgments, such as reinstatement of plant, contribution by way of services, or a judgment
requiring divestment of assets. It may well be, however, that this last point is adequately covered
by the discretion in article 15(1) to refuse enforcement of an order for forms of relief other than
the payment of money.
111 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 3.
112 Id art. 10.
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otherwise be recognized under the law of the court addressed. So, if an
English court would recognize a New York judgment under common
law rules not included in the Convention, as where the defendant is
regarded as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the New York court,
that judgment would still be recognized in England by reason of article
3 provided that English common law remained unchanged.
There is considerable conflict of opinion as to the effect of article 3
on recognition in the United Kingdom which hinges on the words em-
phasized immediately above. As has been said, English courts will rec-
ognize foreign judgments if the defendant submitted or agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. 1 3 Furthermore, a re-
cent, and criticized, 114 decision of the Court of Appeal" 5 has made it
clear that an appearance made solely for the purpose of inviting the
court to exercise its discretion not to exert jurisdiction that it has under
its own local law constitutes submission. The court left open whether
an appearance solely to protest against the jurisdiction of the court
amounts to submission thereto, but it had no doubt that a conditional
appearance with an application to set aside an order for service out of
the jurisdiction does constitute voluntary submission." 16 If the princi-
ple of submission continued to apply to the recognition of American
judgments in the United Kingdom after the draft Convention was im-
plemented, it is true that the jurisdictional bases for the recognition of
foreign judgments in the United Kingdom would have been widened.
If, on the other hand, recognition of American judgments was re-
stricted, in cases falling within the draft Convention, to the recognition
rules there provided, a major difficulty now faced by United Kingdom
defendants would be overcome. As I have indicated elsewhere," 7 an
English exporter with assets in say, New York, is faced with a dilemma
if the proceedings, to which he believes he has a good defense, are
brought against him in New York under jurisdictional circumstances
falling outside the rules of the draft Convention. He must choose be-
tween defending the proceedings in New York, which will amount in
English eyes to submission, or letting the proceedings go by default, in
which case a default judgment will be met out of his New York assets.
113 DICEY AND MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 996-1000 (9th ed. 1973).
114 See, e.g., Collins, Harris v. Taylor Revived, 92 L.Q. REv. 268, 280-87 (1976); Solomons,
Enforcement of Foreign Judgements." Jurisdiction of Foreign Court, 25 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 665
(1976); cf Collier, Foreign Judgement-Enforcement at Common Law-Submission to Foreign Court
in Absence of Pleading to the Merits, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 219 (1975).
115 Henry v. Geoprosco Int'l Ltd., [1976] Q.B. 726.
116 Id at 748.
117 North, supra note 38, at 316.
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The resolution of this dilemma lies in article 3. If the United Kingdom
implements the Convention and leaves the common law rules un-
touched, the dilemma remains. If, however, the United Kingdom im-
plements the Convention and, at the same time, disapplies the common
law rule based on submission to cases covered by the Convention-and
article 3 would permit this-the dilemma disappears and a major
source of criticism of the recognition rules also disappears. Some
paragraphs of article 10 of the draft Convention would then amount to
an addition to the bases of recognition, while abolition of submission as
a basis would constitute a major subtraction. It must be noted that this
is not an inevitable result of the Convention as drafted, but rather a
possible consequence of the way in which it might be implemented in
the United Kingdom. 118
Let us now turn to article 10 of the draft Convention which con-
tains the main list of jurisdictional connecting factors in the court of
origin which will justify recognition in the court addressed. It is at
these bases, and the way in which they are likely to operate in relation
to United Kingdom recognition of American products liability claims,
that the full blast of English criticism has been directed. These jurisdic-
tional bases, and the criticisms of them, need to be examined against
the background of the existing law as to recognition. Two questions
need to be asked: 1) how far will the grounds of jurisdiction in the
Convention make recognition easier in the United Kingdom than it is
now, and 2) is the scope of the rule contained in the draft Convention
clear and unambiguous?
The general grounds of jurisdiction in article 10 follow very much
the pattern of the English common law recognition rules. There can be
very little objection to recognizing a foreign judgment where the person
against whom recognition is sought brought the original proceed-
ings.119 This adds nothing to the common law, being a case of submis-
sion par excellence. Recognition based on the habitual residence of the
defendant in the territory of origin at the time of the original proceed-
ings 20 is like, but narrower than, the common law rule of recognition
based on residence, or even mere presence, in the foreign jurisdiction.
Such a narrowing of the common law rules is similarly to be found in
the case of a defendant who is not a natural person, for then the appro-
priate connecting factor is that he had a principal place of business in
the territory of origin or, if unincorporated, had his headquarters there.
118 See Joint Working Party Memorandum, supra note 93, 1 14.
119 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 10(a).
120 Id art. 10(b).
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The common law rule merely requires the corporate defendant to carry
on business in the foreign country at a definite and reasonably perma-
nent place.12' So far as definition is concerned, habitual residence is
increasingly well-known as an international connecting factor and may
be defined by an exchange of notes between the United Kingdom and
the United States,'22 and it is equally suggested that the identification
of a "place of business" should cause little difficulty. Article 10 goes on
to provide that the court of origin had jurisdiction if the defendant had
"a branch or other establishment" in the territory of origin and the
proceedings were in respect to a transaction or occurrence arising from
business done through that establishment. This is, again, similar to an
existing jurisdictional rule: namely, that found in section 4(2)(a)(v) of
the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933.123
While that statute does not apply to the recognition in the United
Kingdom of American judgments, it is a reasonable jurisdictional
ground and one which has caused no difficulty in practice. The use of
the phrase "branch or other establishment" is novel, but it is a novelty
which stems from the EEC Convention 124 and one to which the United
Kingdom courts at least are going to have to become accustomed.
An agreement in writing or an oral agreement confirmed in writ-
ing to submit to the jurisdiction of the court 125 is a narrower ground
than the common law one of submission. There is, however, a possibil-
ity that the requirement of writing, or written confirmation, may cause
difficulty as it has in the interpretation of the EEC Convention by the
European Court, 2 6 and one would hope for an amendment of this
heading of jurisdiction along the same lines as the amendment now
made to the EEC Convention. 127
The final ground of jurisdiction is that of the appointment of, or
legal duty to appoint, an agent to receive service within the territory of
origin in relation to proceedings concerning business conducted
there.128 This is the general ground that has attracted most criticism in
the United Kingdom, though it should not be forgotten that article 10
has not escaped criticism in the United States, but that criticism has
121 Littauer Glove Corp. v. F.W. Millington Ltd., [1928] 44 T.L.R. 746.
122 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 22.
123 See DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 101, at 1002.
124 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 5(5).
125 Id art. 10(d).
126 Colzani v. Riwa [1976] E.C.R. 1831; Gaieties Segoura v. Banakdarian f1976] E.C.R. 1851.
127 See Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts, supra note 11, art. 17(1), as amended by the 1978
Accession Convention, 21 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 304) (1978).
128 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 10(e).
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been for being too narrow, rather than too broad, in its effects.129 The
criticism of this general ground is directed primarily at jurisdiction be-
ing founded, internationally, on a legal duty to appoint an agent. Brit-
ish exporters to the United States often find themselves under a legal
duty, by state law, to appoint agents to receive service, and there is a
fear in the United Kingdom that the Convention would encourage this
practice. On the other hand, actual appointment of an agent to receive
process, whether because of a legal duty to do so or otherwise, would
appear to be an obvious and reasonable case of voluntary submission
such as to justify assumption of jurisdiction.
It is, however, the special "grounds ofjurisdiction" where criticism
has been the strongest and, in particular, those which could relate to
products liability claims. 130 The first of these is article 10(f):
[I]n the case of a contract to supply goods or services the conclusion of the
contract was preceded by an invitation to treat made by advertisement or
otherwise either in or specifically directed to the territory of origin and the
use of the goods or the performance of the services was in the contempla-
tion of the parties to the contract to occur in whole or in substantial part
in that territory.' 31
There is a provision in the E.E.C. Convention 32 which covers much of
the same ground but which is far more limited in scope in that it only
applies to certain classes of consumer contract. The criticism of article
10(f) that has been voiced is that it is too wide in scope. It is not in
terms restricted to contractual claims. If it were, it would indeed be
likely to arouse the anxieties of United Kingdom exporting producers
and their insurers. 133 While it can be argued that it is not even neces-
sary that there be a contract between plaintiff and defendant in order to
bring a case within this heading, so long as there is a contract with
someone, there does seem to be justification for a jurisdiction at least
founded on the substance of article 10(f). A major step in any renegoti-
ation would be to restrict it to contractual claims. Arguably, it might
also be restricted to actions by consumers. Then if the plaintiff takes all
the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract in his own state in
response to an invitation to negotiate made there, by advertising or
otherwise, it is legitimate for the courts of that state to assume jurisdic-
tion over his contractual claim. It is suggested that this is a legitimate
129 Smit, supra note 37, at 459-62.
130 There has been little opposition to article 10(h), jurisdiction over immovables and tangible
movables based on the situs of the property, and article 10(i), jurisdiction over trusts based on the
trust's principal place of administration.
131 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8.
132 Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts, supra note 11, art. 13.
133 North, supra note 38, at 316-17.
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ground in terms of consumer protection and not one which ought un-
reasonably to worry United Kingdom exporters.
Article 10(g) is, in terms, restricted to contractual claims, and it
applies to those cases where the parties resided, or had a place of busi-
ness, in the territory of origin at the time the contract was concluded
and the obligation in issue was to be wholly or mainly performed there.
This does not amount to much in the way of extension of the common
law jurisdictional rule based on residence. It is different in that the
relevant date for the residence is the date of contract and not of the
proceedings, but it is qualified by the other significant requirements of
the residence of both parties in the territory of origin and the need for
the obligation to be performed there. The latter criterion may be novel
in terms of the common law, but again, it is one with which the United
Kingdom lawyers at least will have to become familiar in the EEC
Convention. 34
The one remaining ground of jurisdiction and the one most rele-
vant to the fear of products liability judgments being enforceable in the
United Kingdom is article 10(j) which provides for jurisdiction where
in the case of an action to recover damages for physical injuries to the
person or for damage to tangible property, the acts or omissions that occa-
sioned the injury or damage substantially occurred, and the injury or
damage was suffered, in the Contracting State in which the court of origin
was exercising jurisdiction, and either those acts or omissions substan-
tially occurred or that injury or damage was suffered in the territory of
origin. ' 35
The effect of this can best be illustrated by one example from a British
viewpoint. An English company exports machinery to the United
States to be assembled there. The company's employees in New York
put the machinery together in a negligent manner, and when the ma-
chinery is used in Illinois, the plaintiff is injured there. A judgment of
an Illinois court would fall for recognition in England by reason of
article 10(). This is because the act or omission causing the injury oc-
curred and the injury was suffered in the contracting state, i.e., the
United States, and the injury was suffered in Illinois, the territory of
origin.
At common law, there is no specific ground of recognition based
on the commission of a tort, or of any element thereof, within the juris-
diction. However, article 10(j) is only of significance in those cases
where the defendant does not have a sufficient business nexus with the
territory of origin so as to satisfy the general heads of jurisdiction of
134 Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts, supra note 1 I, art. 5(1).
135 U.K./U.S. DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 8.
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article 10. At first sight, the likelihood of article 10() resulting in Eng-
lish exporters being exposed to an increased number of U.S. products
liability claims enforced in England is slight, for the act or omission on
which the action is based must have substantially occurred in the
United States. If a product is defective, this is usually attributable to its
manufacture, and that will have taken place in England. No doubt
cases of misconduct in the United States could occur, as in the example
given earlier of the export of machinery to be assembled abroad, but
even then only if the improper assembly in the United States is by the
exporter.
One particular situation has, however, given rise to a good deal of
alarm and that relates to inadequate warnings. If goods are exported
from England to the U.S.A. and they fail to display what, in the U.S.A.,
is regarded as an adequate warning (for example, as to their proper
use) it is certainly arguable that the failure to warn occurs in the
U.S.A. 36 The anxiety of English manufacturers and their insurers 37 is
exacerbated by the judicial attitude of some courts in the U.S.A. as to
the wide range of circumstances where there has been a failure to warn
of the dangers of a product. 38
A further possible danger seen in England 39 is that American
courts may interpret the phrase "the acts or omissions that occasioned
the injury or damage" as including a sale or resale in the United States
of goods manufactured in England, i.e., putting the article into the
stream of commerce. This is a fear which ignores article 12 of the draft
Convention for the court addressed, i.e., the English court in such a
case is not bound by any conclusions reached by the court of origin
relevant to the application of article 10. While the English court is usu-
ally bound by findings of fact, a finding as to where an act or omission
substantially occurred is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of
fact.
There is no doubt that opposition in England to the present draft
of the U.K./U.S. Convention is well organized, articulate, and, so far
as there have now been further negotiations, effective. Whether it is
wholly justified is another matter. It is clear that, in some respects, the
Convention will have the effect that American judgments will be more
readily recognized in the United Kingdom; in other respects, and per-
haps to a lesser degree, they will cease to be recognized. The additional
136 Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) v. Thompson, [1971] A.C. 458.
137 See Payne, supra note 92, at 57.
138 Owles, Complexities of U.S. Product Liabiliy, 128 NEw L.J. 1014 (1978).
139 Joint Working Party Memorandum, supra note 93, 50.
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burden on English defendants of American judgments not being recog-
nized here cannot be said to justify the weight of opposition there has
been to this draft Convention. There are other reasons for it. The draft
Convention seems to have concentrated the minds of manufacturers
and insurers on the possibility of U.S. judgments being enforced here
in products liability cases in a way that the present common law rules
never did. This is not really surprising because the possibility of
change invites comment and discussion. However, many of the criti-
cisms of the draft Convention which have been put forward seem just
as relevant to the present common law rules on recognition, e.g., the
high level of damage awards, including exemplary damages. If, under
the present law, English manufacturers were regularly subjected to ac-
tions in the English courts for the enforcement against them of Ameri-
can judgments, then any extension of that situation would obviously
cause anxiety, but there is no evidence that this is what does happen or
that the anxieties voiced over the Convention's rules have been voiced
over similar common law rules.
A further reason for anxiety seems to be that a variety of bodies
have recommended either in the United Kingdom context, 40 or in a
wider European context,' 4 ' that some form of strict products liability
should be introduced. There is a fear on the part of manufacturers that
this will lead to a "claims explosion" in the United Kingdom, even
though the legal background of American products liability is very dif-
ferent. 142 The possibility of the introduction of strict products liability
in the United Kingdom is a very live issue at the moment, and this has
focused attention on the development of products liability law in the
United States, and thus on the possibility of such American judgments
being enforced in the United Kingdom.
Not everyone is opposed to the draft Convention, for it has been
said that "the interests of both insurers and the public would best be
served by ratification of the Convention and subsequent implementa-
tion." '43 Furthermore, the opposition to it is concentrated in the field
of products liability. This opposition ignores the advantages that may
140 REPORT OF THE LAW COMMISSIONS ON LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS (Law Com.
No. 82) (1977); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY, CMD. No. 7054-I, 255-74 (1978).
141 Council of Europe Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury andDeath (1977); Proposalfor a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regula
tions and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 1976).
142 North, supra note 38, at 318.
143 Clark, mpra note 91, at 1364.
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come to English plaintiffs who may wish to enforce judgments in the
United States, especially in the majority of states which have not
adopted the Uniform Money Judgements Recognition Act."44 It ig-
nores the wide international justification for mutual recognition of
judgments in all commercial fields, not just products liability. Indeed,
it was this which prompted Roskill L.J. to comment:
There is, therefore, no provision between our two countries for reciprocal
enforcement. Some of us, I hope it is not out of place to say, have long
regretted this, and this case is perhaps a good illustration ... of how the
difficulties which have arisen could have been avoided if [the Foreign
Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act] applied between this country
and the United States.145
Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that, without significant amend-
ment, at least in so far as products liability claims and the level of dam-
ages for which such judgments may be enforced are concerned, there
will be continued vigorous opposition in the United Kingdom to the
implementation of this draft Convention.
Addendum
As this article on the draft U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention was
going to press, an amended article 8A became publicly available. This
amendment, which follows, resulted from a meeting between represent-
atives of the United States and the United Kingdom in September
1978, to deal with objections to the proposed Convention by the British
insurance industry.
Where the respondent established that the amount awarded by the
court of origin is greatly in excess of the amount, including costs, that
would have been awarded on the basis of the findings of law and fact
established in the court of origin, had the assessment of that amount been
a matter for the court addressed that court may, to the extent then permit-
ted by the law generally applicable in that court to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, recognize and enforce the judgment in
a lesser amount.
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144 Hay and Walker, supra note 37, at 449.
145 Perry v. Zissis, [19771 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 607, 614, 617.
